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[Crilll. :Ko. 7236. III Bnnk. June IS, UH33.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OSCAR SHIPP. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Homicide--Appeal-Harmless Error.-In a murder prosecu-
tion, it was ('nor to dpny defendant's request that a police 
officer's investigation report concerning his activities in the 
case be produced, but such t'nor was not prejudicial, even 
assullling that the report would have impeached the oificer and 
neutl'alized his test.imony, which tended to prove defendant 
robbed th<; victim and tended to discredit defendant's testi-
lIIony, \\"hel'e def(·ndant admitted that he committed the rob-
bery :Uld t1H'l'e was overwhdming evidence corroborating that 
admission, wher(', in view of contradictions and inconsistencies 
in ddenilnnt's te8timony and the implausible explanations 
offered by him, it was not reasonably probable that without the 
officer's tpstimony the jury would have believed defendant's 
testimony, Hnd where, in view of other evidence. relating to 
defendant's benting of the victim, it was not reasonably prob-
able that without the iofficer's testimony the jury would have 
found defendant innocellt of the beating that cnused the vie-
t illl's death. 
[2] Delinquent Children-·Suspension of Crimina.l Proceedings.-
That Welf. & Inst. Code, § 604, subd. (b), relating to suspen-
sion of criminal proceedings against minors, gives the court 
di:;cretion to deny certification to juvenile court if the minor 
i:s from .18 to 20 years of age, rnther than make such certifica-
tion mandatory as suhd. (n) docs in the cnse of a minor under 
18 years of age, does not make the statute unconstitutionally 
vllgue, since the trial judge must exercise the discretion given 
by subd. (b) reasonably and in furtherance of justice and to 
serve the purposes of the. Juvenile Court Law. 
[3] Id.-Suspension of Crimina.l Proceedings.-It was not an abuse 
of discret.ion to refuse to certify a 19-year-old defendant to the 
juvenile court where the charges against him (robbery and first 
degree lIIurder) justified the conelusion that he was not a fit. 
subj('ct for consid('ration in that court. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, ApP(,(ll and Error, § 616; Am.Jur., Homicide 
(1st ed § 586). 
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Delinquent, Depend<.·nt nnd Neglected Chil-
dl'cn, § 19. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 261; [2, 3] Delinquent 
Children, § 14; [4] Jury, § 103(7); [5] Criminal Law, § 1011.1; [6] 
Criminal Law, § 632. 
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[4] Jury-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-The court 
in a lllurder case did not err in excusing on its own motion 
prospective jurors conscimtiously opposed to the dl'nth penalty. 
[5] Criminal Law-Judgment-Procedure for Determining Penalty. 
-The provisions of Pen. Code, § 190.1, establishing the bifur-
cated trial of a criminnl case in wldch the pennlty is death or 
life imprisonment, are mandatory and may not be waived by a 
defendant who wishes the issues of guilt and penalty to be 
tried together; the fact that such provisions cannot be waived 
docs not make the statute uncoustitutional. 
[6] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Pena.lty Phase of Case.-On the 
penalty phase of a mui'der prosecution, it was not error to re-
fuse to allow defense counsel to read to the jury a newspaper 
article apparently reporting an attempt to abolish the death 
penalty in the Legislature in connection with his argument 
that the death penalty is not morally permissible in any case, 
since such argument was improper, and where the newspaper 
article had not been introduced in evidence nnd did not stnte 
matters of common knowledge of which the jury could take 
judicial notice. 
APPEAL, autolllaticallytaken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a ju\:Igment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. LeRoy Dawson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for robbery and for murder. Judgment of COll-
viction imposing the death penalty on the murder count, af-
firmed. 
Burton Marks, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy At-
torney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Oscar Shipp and La Verne Jones were 
found guilty of the robbery of Bernard Wilkinson (Count I) 
and the robbery and first degree murder of Albert Hawley 
(Counts II and III). For the murder of Hawley the jury 
fixed the penalties as death for Shipp and life illlprisomnent 
for Jones. Jones does not appeal. Shipp's appeal is auto-
matic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
The defendants and both victims were residents of the Presi-
dent Hotel in Los Angeles. Late in the evening on December 
30, 1961, two men assaulted and robbed Wilkinson in his room. 
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He was unable to identify his assailants. He testified that he 
was beaten ullconscious, that he suffered three broken ribs and 
numerous cuts and bruises on l1is face, that bet\veen $7.00 and 
$8.00 were taken from his person, and that a cigarette lighter 
was taken from his room. 
Hawley occupied a room one floor above Wilkinson's. The 
110tel manager fonnd him there on the morning of December 
31, and observed that his face was bloody, The manager asked, 
"Who done itt" and Hawley replied, "Two white men." The 
police were called, and Officer Hickey was the first to arrive at 
the hotel. He testified that Hawley's room was disarranged 
and that Hawley's face was bloody and his shirt open. Officer 
Hickey saw a foot impression on Hawley's chest. A pocket 
was ripped from his trousers. 
Hawley told Officer Hickey that during the night someone 
knocked at his door and said "This is the management." 
As he opened the door two men pushed in, knocking him down. 
They beat him on the head and body and kicked him numerous 
times. Hawley said that ten cents was taken from him. When 
asked who had done it, he said, "Two white men." After 
Hawley was taken to the hospital, Officer Hickey asked him for 
a further description, and Hawley said, "I don't really know. 
I didn't see them." 
Hawley died on January 5, 1962. Dr. Kade, the autopsy 
surgeon, testified that the autopsy revealed over 20 rib frac-
tures, three fractures of the sternum, a fractured vertebra, 
pulmonary contusions, hemorrhage inside the chest, extensive 
discoloration across the front and sides of the chest, and 
various head, face, and lower body injuries. It was Dr. Kade's 
opinion that the fractures caused terminal bronchial pneu-
monia and resulted in Hawley's death. He stated that the 
pattern of the fractures indicated that Hawley's rib cage 
collapsed from a crushing force exerted on the front of his 
chest. In Dr. Kade's opinion Hawley was lying on his back 
on a flat surface when the force was exerted, and was struck 
several blows on the chest with a heavy flat object. 
Shipp and Jones were arrested on January 2. On January 8 
they were taken to a room in the hall of justice, where they 
made voluntary statements to the police. Recordings of those 
statements were made without defendants' knowledge and 
were received in evidence at the trial. Jones gave the follow-
ing account: 
He and Shipp were in the lobby of the President Hotel on 
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the night of December 30, 1961. They saw Wilkinson enter tlIl' 
hotel and board the elevator. 'l'hey ran up the stairs to the 
third floor and went to Wilkinson's room. They unlocked the 
door with a master key that Shipp was carrying. When 
Wilkinson entered, Jones hit him. He found 90 cents in 
Wilkinson's poeket, which he took. Wilkinson began to strug-
gle, and Jones hit him again. He searched the room and 
found some hair oil and a cigarette lighter. He hit Wilkinson 
again. Shipp then hit Wilkinson "a couple of times more" 
and they left. 
On Shipp's suggestion they went to Hawley's room on the 
fourth floor. The master key would not open the door. They 
knocked, and Shipp said, "This is Eddy the guy down-
stairs." (Eddy was the night clerk of the hotel.) They heard 
a voice in the room, but the door was not opened, and they 
broke in. Shipp grabbed Hawley, and Jones attempted to 
close the door. The door would not latch. At that point Jones 
heard someone in the hall, and then felt someone push on the 
door. Jones held the door with his foot and hands. The 
person in the hall left, and Jones was able to latch the door. 
When Hawley made a noise, Jones told Shipp to keep him 
quiet. Jones then noticed that Shipp had his arm around 
Hawley's neck and that Hawley was bleeding from one ear. 
Jones ripped a pocket from Hawley's trousers and took his 
wallet. Shipp and Jones searched the closet and found noth-
ing. When Hawley again made a noise, Shipp "went back 
over there and held him down and shut him up with his hand 
over his mouth or something." Jones then searched the 
dressei, under the bed, and under the mattress while Shipp 
held Hawley. Jones believed that Shipp struck Hawley once 
with his fist. 
Shipp and Jones then went to Jones' room on the third 
floor. They looked in the wallets (Jones believed there were 
two) and found nothing. Shipp said, "I'm going back up-
stairs because I think maybe we missed something." Shipp 
left, and Jones went to bed. 
At the conclusion of his statement, Jones said that on the 
night of the robberies Shipp wore a light jacket and a light 
shirt. He noticed blood on the sleeve of the jacket and warned 
Shipp to get rid of it. 
Shipp denied returning to Hawley's room, and then said, 
"The other night of the robbery, the first man Barney 
[Wilkinson] -it was all like Verne [Jones] said. " Shipp 
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admitted cOlllmitting both robberi('S with Jones and agreed 
with J oues' lIccount of tllClll, except that he denied striking 
Hawley, Ill' denied kicking Hawley. He could not remember 
whether he lJad W01'11 a jacket or just a white T-shirt. When 
Ilsk('d about blood found 011 his shoe, he stated, "Now, like I 
said, it had to have Come from the fourth floor, it had to. 
'fhat's the only possible way the blood could have gotten Oil 
the shoes." He stated that he tried to get the wallet out of 
Hawley's pocket, "but Verne pulled this tiling off. H 
Jones' palm print was found on the inside of the door to 
Hawley's room on January 2. 'When Shipp was arrested a 
jacket was found in his closct. The jacket and one of ShiPl) 's 
shoes were stained with w11at appeared to be blood. A key was 
among Shipp's belollgings at the county jail. Officer Sel'ct 
took the key to the President Hotel and found that it unlocked 
the door to Wilkillson's room, but 110t the door to Ha wiey '8 
room. 
Officer Rodney testified for the prosecution that on Janu-
ary 11, 1962, hc searched the room that Sllipp had occupied 
and found a journal and two Coast F~'deral Savings passbooks 
behind a refrigerator. Another witness identified handwriting 
on the journal as Hawley's, and tcstified that Hawley had an 
account at Coast Fed!'ral Savings. On cross-examination Oili-
eel' Rodney admitted that he 11ad made an investigation report 
concerning his "activities in the case." Shipp's motion ·for 
production of the report for the purposes of impeachment 
was denied. J 
[1] We agree with Shipp's cOlltelltion that it was error to 
dell)" production of Officer Rodney's report. A suffiei!'nt 
foundation for production was laid by showing that the wit-
ness had made a report relating to matters covered in his 
testimony. (People v. Estrada, 54 Ca1.2d 713, 716 [7 Cal 
Rptr. 897, 355 P.2d 641] ; Funk Y. Supcrim' Coltrt, 52 Ca1.2d 
423 [340 P.2d 593] ; People Y. Chapman, 52 Cal.2d 95, 98·99 
[338 P.2d 428].) 
In deciding whether this error was prejudicial, we must 
determine whether there was a reasonable probability that tIle 
jury would have reached a different verdict had the report 
been produced. (People v, Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 588 [305 
P.2d 1].) Since we do not know tIle contents of the report, we 
must assume that production would have enabled Shipp to 
impeach Officer Rodney and thereby neutralize his testimony. 
The issue, therefore, is whether it is reasonably probable that 
) 
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the verdict would have been different had Officer Rodney's 
testimony been excluded.1 
Officer Rodney's testimony tended to prove that Shipp 
robbed Hawley. It is not reasonably probable, howevcr, that 
the jury's conclusion on that issue would have been different 
without Officer Rodney's testimony. Shipp admitted that he 
committed the robbery, and the evidence corroborating that 
admission is overwhelming. 
Officer Rodney's testimony also tended to discredit Shipp's 
testimony, because it contradicted Shipp's claim that he knew 
nothing about the passbooks and journal. Shipp's testimony, 
however, was contradicted by other evidence. He denied 
telling Jones that he would get rid of his jacket. Jones testi. 
fied to the contrary. Shipp denied that he ever intended to 
rob Hawley, though he admitted that he broke into Hawley's 
room, that he held his hand over Hawley's mouth while Jones 
searched the room, and that when he left the room Hawley 
was lying on the floor and bleeding from the ear. He testified 
that the blood on his jacket and shoe came from a fight he had 
been in before the robberies. When asked why he had previ-
ously stated that the blood must have come from the fourth 
floor, he explained that the fight occurred on the fourth floor. 
He claimed that he mentioned the fight during his recorded 
statement, and theorized that it was not recorded because the 
recorder was turned off. Officer Benson testified that the 
recorder was not turned off at any time during the taking of 
the statements and that the tape accurately and fairly re-
flected what was said. 
Shipp's testimony was not only contradicted, but was incon-
sistent with his recorded statement and with Jones' statement, 
which Jones repeated on the stand. Shipp denied that Haw. 
ley's door had been latched or that he had said he was Eddy. 
When confronted with his recorded statements to the contrary, 
lIt appears that this evidence might have been excluded on another 
ground. Shipp's objection to the aumission of the passbooks and journal 
on the ground they were obtained by an illegal search was overruled. 
Officer Rodney admitted that he did not have a warrant for the search of 
Shipp's room. 'rhe prosecution then had the burden of showing justifica· 
tion. (Priestly v. SUpe.-iOT Court, 50 Ca1.2d 812, 816 [330 P.2d 39].) 
Officer Rodney testified that at the time of the search the room was. 
"'-arant," and that a janitor was present during the search. Although 
it might be inferred that at the time of the sear(lh the room had no tenant 
and that the hotel management consenteu to the search, the evidence to 
that effect is ambiguous. Under the circumstances the prosecution could 
have made a clear showing of a valid consent, if in fact the room had no 
tenant and the hotel management had authorized the search. 
) 
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he (~xplaillcd that his ])I'io1' statt>lllellts were lies. lIe denied 
trying' to get tlw wallet from Hawley's pocket, but did not 
explain w]IY he ]Iud admitted doing so ill his recorded state-
ment. He denied that lie saw Jones take Hawlcy's wallet, 
though he had previously admitted seeing Jones rip off the 
pocket fl'om whicll Shipp had attempted to remove the wallet. 
In view of these contradictions and inconsistencies and the 
impluusiblcexplauations offered by Shipp, it is not reasonably 
probable that without Officer Rodney's testimony the jury 
would have believed Shipp's testimony. Nor is it reasonably 
probable tllat without Officer Rodney's testimony the jury 
would Jun'e found Shipp innocent of the beating that caused 
Hawley's death. Since Jones denied any knowledge of the 
passbooks and journal, the finding of that property in Shipp's 
room tended to pron~ that Shipp alone made a second visit to 
Hawley'S room. Had that evidence been excluded, it is pos-
siblc that thc jury would llave concluded that Shipp did not 
return to Hawley's room. It is not reasonably probable, 
however, that this conclusion would have led the jury to then 
conclude that Shipp did lIot inflict the fatal beating. 
Shipp admitted bt'ating and robbillg Wilkinson. He ad-
mitted going to Ha,vley's room immediately thereafter. It 
was his task to keep Hawley quiet, and he accomplished a 
similar task by beating Wilkinson. Three times Hawley 
made a noise and was quieted by Shipp. Jones denied seeing 
Shipp kick Hawley, but he was holding the door and search-
ing the room and could not have seen everything Shipp did. 
He testified that he saw Shipp strike Hawley with his fist and 
hold an arm around Hawley's neck and a hand over his 
mouth. When Jones left the room, he saw that Hawley was 
lying on the floor and moaning. Blood was coming from 
Hawley's car. Shipp's jacket and shoe were stained with 
blood. Hawley stated that the two men who robbed him also 
struck him and kicked him numerous times. His description 
of the way his assailants broke into his room was substantially 
similar to that giyen by Shipp and Jones in their recorded 
statements and by Jones' testimony. 
It is true that Hawley identified his attackers as "two 
white men," and that Shipp and Jones are Negroes. He later 
admitted, however, that he did not see them and did not 
really know. Moreover, Shipp and Jones admit that they 
attacked and robbed Hawley. Hawley was conscious and 
unhurt when they broke into his room. Hawley did not say 
) 
852 PEOPLE V. SHIPP [59 C.2d 
t.hat two separate pairs of men broke into his room. If there 
was a second pair, Hawley was apparently not conscious of 
tll<'m. 
It is possible that Hawley was assaulted by two white men 
after Shipp and Jones left his room. It is possible that 
Hawley was conscious and saw them but believed tl1at they 
were the same men who had robbed him. These possibilities, 
however, are not materially reduced by Officer Rodney's testi. 
mony. We do not believe that the exclusion of his testimony 
would have made it more likely that the jury would believe 
that after Shipp and Jones left Hawley's room two other men 
entered and inflicted the fatal injuries. 
[2] At the beginning of the trial it was established that 
Shipp was 19 years of age. His motion for certification to 
the juvenile court 'vas denied. Shipp contends that certifica· 
tion was mandatory under section 604, subdivision (b), of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code, which provides: "Whenever a 
case is pending in any court upon an accusatory pleading and 
it appears to the satisfaction of the judge that the person 
charged is under the age of 21 years, the judge may certify 
the case to the juvenile court in his county in the manner pre· 
scribed by subdivision (a) of this section." (Italics added.) 
Subdivision (a) provides that if the defendant is under the 
age of 18 years the trial judge must suspend proceedings 
and certify the defendant to the juvenile court. 
Subdivision (b) gives the trial court discretion to deny cer· 
tification if the defendant is from 18 to 20 years of age. Shipp 
contends, however, that unless the ,vord "may" in subdivision 
(b) is construed as "must," the provision is "unconstitu-
tionally vague" and denies equal protection of the laws be-
cause it contains no standards to guide the trial judge iii. exer-
cising his discretion. This contention is without merit. Sub-
division (b) does not authorize the trial judge arbitrarily or 
capriciously to grant or deny certification tothe juvenile court. 
Even though the statute contains no express standards, the 
trial judge must exercise his discretion reasonably and in 
furtherance of justice. (Cf. Ordway v. Arata, 150 Cal.App.2d 
71 [309 P.2d 919] [Code Civ. Proc;, § 583]; Georgison v. 
Georgison,43 Ca1.2d 550 [275 P.2d 3] [Code Civ. Proc., § 685] ; 
National Electric Supply Co. v. Mt. Diablo Unified School 
Dist., 187 Cal.App.2d 418 [9 Cal.Rptr. 864] [Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1048] ; People v. Romero, 156 Cal.App.2d 48, 51 [318 P.2d 
835] [Code Civ. Proc., § 2042] ; In rc Newbern, 55 Ca1.2d 500, 
503·504 [11 Cal.Rptr. 547, 360 P.2d 43] [Pen. Code, § 1272].) 
) 
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By implication s('ction 604 rcquires thc trial court to exercise 
its discretion to serve tIle purposes of the Juv('nile Court Lal\'. 
(Cf. In "e l'cte1'sen, 51 Cal.2d 177,185 (331 P.2d 24, 77 A.L.R. 
2d 1291J; People v. Bal'llett, 27 Ca1.2d 649,656 [166 P.2d 4].) 
[3] The trial court did not abuse its discretioll in refusing 
to certify Sllipp to the juvenile court. The nature of the 
charges against him justifies the conclusion that he was not a 
fit subjl'ct for consideration in the juvenile court. (See Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 606; People v. Yeager, 55 Ca1.2d 374, 389 [10 
Ca1.Rptr. 829, 359 P.2d 261].) 
[4] The trial court did not err in excusing prospective 
jurors conscientiously opposed to t1le dC'uth. penalty. ( People 
v. Love, 56 Cal.!?d 720, 726 [16 Ca1.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 
481, 366 P.2d 33, 809] ; Prople Y. J)uncan, 53 Ca1.2d 803, 816 
[3 Cal.Rptr. 331,350 P.2d 103J ; People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 
575,576 [305 P.2d 1], eert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 [77 S.Ct. 721, 
1 L.Ed.2d 724J.) It is immaterial that tIle trial court ('xcused 
the jurors on its own motion. It was required to examine th(' 
prospective jurors. (Pen. Code, § 1078.) When that exami-
nation revealed tIl\' jurors' conscientiolls objections, it was the 
trial court's duty to excuse them. (Cf. People v. Goldenson, 
76 Cal. 328, 346 [19 P. 161J.) 
[5] At the trial Shipp moved that the issues of guilt and 
penalty be tried tog<.>ther. The motion was denied under sec-
tion 190.1 of the Penal Code. Shipp contends that section 
190.1 was enacted for the bf'l1efit of defendants and therf>fore 
can be waived. He further contends that if it cannot be 
waived it is unconstitutional. These contentions are without 
merit. The provisions of s<.>etion 190.1 establishing the bifur-
cated trial are mandatory, and their constitutionality is 
settled. (People v. Love., 56 Ca1.2d 720, 725 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 
17 Ca1.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33,809] ; People v. Corwin, 52 Cal. 
2d 404, 407 [340 P.2d 626] ; People v. Dltflcan, 51 Cal.2d 523, 
529 [334 P.2d 858] ; People v. Feldkamp, 51 Cal.2d 237, 240-
241 [331 P.2d 632] ; People. v. Wm'd, 50 Ca1.2d 702, 706-711 
[328 P.2d 777, 76 A.L.R.2d 911] ; Ward v. State of California 
(9th Cir. 1959) 269 1<'.2<1 906.) 
[6] During nrgulllf>nt on the penalty counsel for Shipp 
argued that tIll' death plHlalty is not morally permissible in 
any case. In i:!nppurt of this arg'ument he attempted to read 
a newspaper article tlHlt apparently rl'portetl all attempt to 
abolish the death peualty in the IJcgislatul'<'>. Shipp con-
tends Ulat the trial cOllrt erred in refusing to pcrmit the read-
ing of the article to the jury. 
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Counsel's argument was improper. The choice between the 
death penalty and life imprisonment is within the discretion 
of the jury. (Pen. Code, § 190.) "General views of the social 
desirability or moral permissibility of capital punishment 
could logically have no place among the factors influencing 
the exercise of a discretion so conceived." (People v. Riser, 
47 Ca1.2d 566, 575 [305 P.2d 1].) By arguing that capital 
punishment is not proper ill any case, counsel in effect urged 
the jury to disregard the IJegislature's determination to the 
contrary. Moreover, the newspaper article had not been in-
troduced in evidence, nor did it state matters of common knowl-
edge of which the jury could take judicial notice. (See People 
Y. Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 730-732 [16 Cal.Rptr. 177, 17 Cal.Rptr. 
481,366 P.2d 33, 809].) 
There is no merit in tIle contention that the trial court com-
mitted prejudicial error in several rulings on evidence. 
The judgment on each count is affirmed. 
Gibson, C.J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, 
J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 17, 
1963. 
